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Abstract
This paper investigates the ﬁnancing behaviour of Dutch ﬁrmsby testingwhether a ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancing decisions are determined by certain factors identiﬁed in various theories. Since a
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing decision is reﬂected in the changes of its leverage, our research focuses on
the relationship between a ﬁrm’s debt ratio change and the changes in certain factors. The
approach used in the paper is the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique. The model
identiﬁes various important factors that are related to Dutch ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions. The
empirical results provide moderate support for the static trade-off theory, the pecking-order
hypothesis, as well as the dynamic capital structure model. However, our data set is insufﬁ-
cient to conﬁrm the static trade-off theory, and our results provide little evidence to back the
asymmetric information argument behind the pecking-order hypothesis.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G32, C31
Key Words: Financing behaviour; Capital structure; Structural equation model (SEM);
Dutch ﬁrms.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The traditional static trade-off model of capital structure theory (Miller, 1977) suggests that
a ﬁrm’s choice between debt and equity is determined by trading off various tax beneﬁts of
debt ﬁnancing against the cost of potential ﬁnancial distresses. The pecking order theory
(Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984)) suggests that due to asymmetric information,
ﬁrms prefer to fund new investment projects with retained earnings rather than using debt
ﬁnancing, but further prefer debt ﬁnancing to equity ﬁnancing. The dynamic models of cap-
ital structure, as proposed in Fisher, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) and Leland (1984, 1998),
straddle over the above two theories by introducing transaction costs. On the one hand, these
models generate short-term pecking order behavior. On the other hand, the dynamic capital
structure models suggest that ﬁrms will periodically readjust their capital structures towards
a target ratio that reﬂects the costs and beneﬁts of debt ﬁnancing as suggested in the static
trade-off models. Other theories such as agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen,
1986; Harris and Raviv, 1990 ; Stulz, 1990; Diamond, 1989; Hirshleifer and Thaker, 1989,
etc.), signaling models (Ross, 1977; Heinkel, 1982; Poitevin, 1989, etc.) and industrial
organization models (Titman, 1984; Brander and Lewis, 1986; Maksivomic, 1988; Sarig,
1988; Maksimovic and Titman, 1991, etc.) offer alternative explanations to a ﬁrm’s capital
structure choice.
Empirical studies have aimed to test whether certain factors suggested by various theo-
ries are the determinants of a ﬁrm’s capital structure choice. However, in most of the studies,
such as Bowen et al. (1982), Bradley et al. (1984), Long and Malitz (1985), Titman and
Wessels (1988), Friend and Hasbrouch (1988), Lang (1988), MacKie-Mason (1990), and
Rajan and Zingales (1995) etc., while the capital structure is measured by a ﬁrm’s accumu-
lated leverage, i.e. the total debt-equity ratio, the factors used in the models such as asset
tangibility, ﬁrm size, growth, proﬁtability, earnings volatility, etc. are mostly constructed
b a s e do naﬁrm’s current characteristics. Thus, many available studies have reached either
inconclusive or contradicting results. We argue that a ﬁrm’s debt-equity ratio may partially
reﬂect a ﬁrm’s current ﬁn a n c i n gd e c i s i o nb u t ,t oal a r g e rextent, is simply the outcome of a
ﬁrm’s accumulated historical ﬁnancing decisions. From a dynamic point of view, a ﬁrm’s
current characteristics may only be able to explain a ﬁrm’s on-going ﬁnancing behavior. Ho-
vakimian, Opler and Titman (2000) explicitly argue that ﬁrms may change over time, thus
their capital structure choice may change as well. Evidence in empirical studies suggest
2that a ﬁrm’s history of ﬁnancing decisions may play a very important role in determining its
capital structure. For example, following large increases in stock prices, ﬁr m st e n dt oi s s u e
equity which leads to the decrease in leverage, see for example Masulis and Korwar (1986);
Asquith and Mullins (1986); and Kozajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald (1988) . In addition, af-
ter a proﬁtable calendar year, a ﬁrm tends to use earnings to pay down debt and consequently
becomes less levered, see for example Titman and Wessels (1988). Furthermore, ownership
structure change also seems to clearly inﬂuence capital structure. In general, the more con-
centrated a ﬁrm’s ownership structure, the more debt it seems to desire and to be able to
tolerate. Individual managers who plac eah i g hv a l u eo nt h ep e r s o n a lb e n e ﬁts of controlling
a corporation will tend to prefer new debt to new equity issues for ﬁnancing, because this
minimizes dilution of their ownership stake, see Kim and Sörensen (1986), Friend and Long
(1988).
In this paper, we test the capital structure theories by investigating the relationship be-
tween the change of a ﬁrm’s leverage and the changes in various factors as well as current
level of leverage. The basic idea of looking at the dynamic change in the leverage and var-
ious factors is to remove pre-existing ﬁrm conditions in our analysis on the one hand, and
to be more consistent with various capital structure theories on the other. Since the change
of a ﬁrm’s leverage is mostly resulted from its on-going choice between debt ﬁnancing and
equity ﬁnancing among other factors, it is essentially the result of a ﬁrm’s current ﬁnancing
decisions. In other words, we are testing whether a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing decisions are determined
by the changes in various factors that are identiﬁed by capital structure theories and the fo-
cus of our research is on a ﬁrm’s current ﬁnancing behavior. We also include the current
level of a ﬁrm’s capital structure in our model in order to test whether a ﬁrm’s subsequent
capital structure change is related to its current debt ratio, i.e. whether ﬁrms adjust their
capital structures toward an optimal or target debt-equity ratio, which is suggested by the
traditional static trade-off model and dynamic capital structure models. Thus our model is
different from previous empirical studies in the following aspects. First, our models explic-
itly account for the fact that ﬁrms may change over time, and the analysis of ﬁrms’ capital
structure choice is based on a ﬁrm’s current ﬁnancing behavior. Second, in our model, we
use the changes in various factors to explain the current ﬁnancing behavior of a ﬁrm, i.e. the
change of a ﬁrm’s debt ratio. In other words, we aim to test whether ﬁr m sm a k es i g n i ﬁcant
changes debt or equity capital in response to the changes in various factors that determine the
3costs and beneﬁts of debt and equity ﬁnancing. Finally, we also include the current leverage
in our model to test whether it is a factor in ﬁrms’ capital structure choice.
Apart from previously mentioned empirical studies on capital structure, the research on
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing behavior in the Netherlands has also been carried out from both micro
and macro perspectives. Muuers et al. (1991) test industry differences for Dutch non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms and suggest a signiﬁcant difference in the equity ratios between industries in
the Netherlands. Cross-section and panel data studies by Cools (1993), Kemna et al. (1994),
Van Dijk (1997) conﬁrm that ﬁrms’ leverage is positively related to ﬁrms’ collateral value
and size, and negatively related to ﬁrms’ business risk. However, they ﬁnd positive relation-
ship between leverage and growth proxies. Case
studies among Dutch ﬁrms include Nationale Investeringsbank (1990), Drop and Schuit
(1992), Cools (1993), BDO CampObers (1993) , and De Jong and Veld (2001). Time series
macroeconomic approach to the analysis of corporate ﬁnance has been carried out to investi-
gate the macroeconomic determinants of aggregate trends. These studies include Fase et al.
(1990), Fase and Winder (1990) , Draper (1991), Driehuis and Mulder (1993) , Van Ees et
al. (1993), Kusters (1994), Jacobs and Sterken (1994).
T h ea p p r o a c hu s e di nt h i sp a p e ri st h es t r u c tural equation modeling (SEM) technique.
T h ed a t ai sc o l l e c t e df r om publicly traded Dutch ﬁrms. Since the attributes identiﬁed as
determinants of a ﬁrm’s capital structure choice by capital structure theories are often not
directly observed, there is in general no single accounting indicator that can be used as an
exact representation of each attribute. Instead, the theoretical attributes are often related to
one or more accounting indicators (often referred to as proxies of the attributes) with embed-
ded measurement error. Consequently, in the empirical analysis of capital structure choice,
in order to investigate the relationship between the capital structure and various attributes
or factors, one also needs to identify the relationship between the theoretical attributes and
certain observed accounting indicators. In the structural equation modeling framework, the
former relationship is referred to as the structural model, while the latter relationship is re-
ferredtoasthemeasurementmodel. Thestructuralequationmodelingprovidesaﬂexibleand
powerful approach of simultaneously assessing the quality of measurement and examining
the structural relations underlying the theory. In the structural model, we identify the at-
tributes or factors that may affect a ﬁrm’s leverage based on various capital structure theories
with consideration of the unique aspect of Dutch institutional setting. In the measurement
4m o d e l ,v a r i o u sl e v e r a g em e a s u r e sa n dp r o x i e sf or the attributes or factors are constructed
based on accounting data, again keeping in mind the speciﬁc Dutch accounting rules and tax
laws. Furthermore, different from previous studies, observed variables in our model have
been carefully re-scaled in order to be consistent with model assumptions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a discussion of the de-
terminants of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing choices. Section 3 describes the data set used in our study
and the construction of proxies of various factors. Section 4 presents the structural equation
model of ﬁrms ﬁnancing behavior, with discussions on both the structural model and mea-
surement model. Section 5 presents the empirical results and discuss their implications on
Dutch ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing behavior. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Cost of Debt Financing versus Equity Financing
A c c o r d i n gt oc o r p o r a t eﬁnance theory, a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing choice depends on the cost of avail-
able capitals. The cost of capital is determined by many factors, of which some are country
speciﬁc factors, pertaining to a country’s unique institutional setting, others are generic fac-
tors that are common to all countries. Within each country, the factors also include ﬁrm
speciﬁc factors and macroeconomic factors that are common to all ﬁrms. In this paper, we
focus on ﬁrm speciﬁc factors and aim to investigate how the changes in these factors affect
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions. Understanding that these factors affect a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing decision
via the cost of debt and equity, we will brieﬂy discuss the impact of various factors on the
cost and beneﬁto fd e b tﬁnancing and equity ﬁnancing. We start our discussion with some
speciﬁc institutional settings in the Netherlands.
A. Tax law, accounting rules and bankruptcy law Static trade-off theory claims that the
optimal level of a ﬁrm’s leverage is achieved by weighing the beneﬁts of debt ﬁnancing
against the cost of potential ﬁnancial distress. In other words, a ﬁrm’s optimal capital struc-
ture level can be reached by trading off the beneﬁto fd e b tﬁnancing, namely tax advantages,
against the cost of probability of bankruptcy. For different institutional settings, the tax ad-
vantage and the bankruptcy costs are different. Therefore, we may observe different capital
structure patterns. In the Netherlands, there is a very unique factor, referred to as “provi-
sion”, that undermines the tax beneﬁto fd e b tﬁnancing. On the consolidated balance sheets
of Dutch ﬁrms, there is a line called “the provision for bad debt and pension liability.” Ac-
5cording to the Dutch tax law, the provision for bad debt can either be subtracted directly from
account receivables on the left-hand side of the balance sheet, or be 100% tax deductible
against income and with the remaining portiona d d e db a c kt ot h ep r o v i s i o no nt h er i g h t - h a n d
side of the balance sheet1. The same applies to pension liability2. The provision amount is a
very signiﬁcant portion of the right-hand side of the balance sheet for Dutch ﬁrms. For ex-
ample, the average book value long-term leverage, deﬁned as book value long term debt over
book value total capital assets, is 18.9% for the Dutch ﬁrms in our sample over the period
of 1994-1996, whereas the provision ratio, deﬁned as the provision over book value total
capital assets, is 12.1% over the same period3. We argue that the favorable tax treatment of
provision may undermine the importance of the beneﬁto fd e b tﬁnancing for Dutch ﬁrms due
to the “crowding-out effect” of non-debt tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). In other
words, other things equal, Dutch ﬁrms may prefer to use less debt than their competitors in
other countries due to the provision, thus the optimal capital structure for Dutch ﬁrms will
be less levered.
As for the cost of potential bankruptcy, we argue the potential bankruptcy costs for Dutch
ﬁrms are higher than some other countries, for example, the United States. The argument
stems from the fact that the Dutch bankruptcy law gives more weight to creditors’ protection
relative to facilitating ﬁrms to re-organize and to turn around4. Firms entering bankruptcy
a r ev e r yl i k e l yt ob el i q u i d a t e d . S i n c et h el i quidation value is generally lower than going
concern value, therefore, bankruptcy cost is potentially higher in the Netherlands. Thus
from the potential bankruptcy cost perspective, Dutch ﬁrms may also be less levered.
B. The structure of debt market and the cost of borrowing In assessing the quality of
a ﬁrm’s debt, for the purpose of pricing, the widely referred approach is the credit rating
1For example, if a ﬁrm has NLG100 bad debt, it can subtract this amount from its income, assuming the
ﬁrm’s corporate tax rate is 35%, the NLG(100-35)=NLG65 is added to the provision on the right hand side of
the balance sheet.
2However, it is worth to mention that the pension liability included in the provision is only for top man-
agement. The regular employee pension contributions by employers are deducted as a part of the personnel
costs.
3There is no consensus to whether provision should be treated as equity or liability. From a theoretical
point of view, provisions (here excluding deferred tax) are clearly liabilities. However, technically, there is no
interest costs on these liabilities, the timing and the amount of the provisions being added to the balance sheet
is at a ﬁrm’s management discretion, therefore, they are not liabilities in a strict sense. Whether or not the
provisions should be treated as liabilities can directly affect the leverage ratio of Dutch ﬁrms.
4For a detailed discussion on Dutch Bankruptcy laws, see Couwenburg (1997).
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United States due to its well developed bond market. However, if ﬁrms don’t use capital
market, i.e. the bond market, to raise their debt, instead they use their banks as their major
source of debt ﬁnancing, credit rating is of less importance. This is exactly the case in the
Netherlands. According to De Bondt (1998), about 97% of the Dutch private debts are lent
by ﬁnancial institutions and only 3% of the private debts are raised from the capital market.
If bond prices reﬂect market information, the value of a bank loan resulting from the long-
term relationship between ﬁrms and banks is ap r i o r iunknown, both to the market and to
the regulator (James, 1987; Merton and Perold, 1993). In addition, as for the composition of
board of directors for Dutch ﬁrms, there is usually a board member coming from the ﬁrm’s
bank, which may further imply that there is less information asymmetry between borrowers
and lenders, thus lowering ﬁrms’ cost of debt. However, the overall effects of bank ﬁnancing
versus bond market ﬁnancing is unclear. It may depend on the distribution of bargaining
power between ﬁrms and banks and also the industrial structure of Dutch banking sector. It
is worth to mention that the concentration level of Dutch banking sector is extremely high
compared with other European countries. For example, in 1998, the share of loans from the
top three Dutch banks as a percentage of total bank loans is 73.8%, whereas the ratio is only
19.8% for Germany, 24.5% for France, 24% for Italy, 30.9% for UK, and 52.3% for Belgium
respectively (De Bondt, 1998) . The high concentration level of Dutch banks can imply that
the cost of debt ﬁnancing in the Netherlands are higher compared with other countries simply
due to the industrial structure of Dutch banking sector.
The unique ﬁrm-bank relationship may not only affect the cost of borrowing for Dutch
ﬁrms, but also affect the overall Dutch ﬁrms’ leverage level. The presence of bankers as
board of directors for Dutch ﬁrms may cause ﬁrms to have lower leverage. As the stake
holder of the ﬁrm (debt holder more precisely), banks are more conservative about ﬁrms’
debt ﬁnancing compared to shareholders. In other words, banks will make certain that ﬁrms
they ﬁnance are not over-levered beyond their comfort level. Therefore, the leverage level
may also be lower due to the important role that banks play in debt ﬁnancing and their
presence in Dutch ﬁrms’ boardrooms.
C. Firm sizes Firm size has a direct impact on the pattern of ﬁnancing choices. Larger
ﬁr m sa r eu s u a l l yb e l i e v e dt oh a v ee a s i e ra c c e s st ot h eﬁnancial market due to long retractable
ﬁn a n c i n gh i s t o r y ,t h e yt e n dt os u f f e rl e s si n f ormation asymmetry due to analysts’ coverage
7(thus outsiders will have more information about the ﬁrm). Therefore, the cost of debt for
larger ﬁrms may be lower than that of smaller ﬁrms holding everything else equal (Myers and
Majluf, 1984). Some also argue that larger ﬁr m st e n dt ob em o r ed i v e r s i ﬁed in their projects,
therefore, the probability of total failure, i.e. bankruptcy, is relatively smaller (Bradley et
al. 1984; Long and Malitz, 1985; Harris and Raviv, 1991; and Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
Size is often used as an inverse proxy for probability of bankruptcy and is considered to be
positively correlated to ﬁrms’ leverage.
D. Growth perspective “Pecking-order" hypothesis suggests a negative relationship be-
tween leverage and growth opportunity. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), information
asymmetry demands an extra premium for ﬁrms to raise external funds irrespective of the
true quality of their investment project. In the case of issuing debt, the extra premium is
reﬂected in the higher required yield. Firms with growth opportunities may ﬁnd it too costly
to rely on debt to ﬁnance its growth. The “under-investment" agency problem also suggests
a negative relationship between leverage and growth. Highly leveraged ﬁrms are more likely
to pass up proﬁtable investment opportunities (Myers, 1977).
E. Financial performance The major ﬁnancial performance indicators mentioned in cap-
ital structure literature are proﬁtability and earning volatility. “Pecking-order" hypothesis
suggests that ﬁrms prefer to use internal funds versus external funds for capital expendi-
ture (Myers and Majluf, 1984). A proﬁtable ﬁrm presumably has more internal funds at
its disposal than a less proﬁtable ﬁrm. Therefore, the relationship between proﬁtability and
leverage should be negative. However, Jensen (1986) argues that the relationship between
leverage and proﬁtability depends on the effectiveness of the market for corporate control.
If the market for corporate control is effective, managers of proﬁtable ﬁrms are forced to
pay out cash by leveraging up. On the supply side, lenders are also more willing to lend
to proﬁtable ﬁrms. Therefore, the relationship between leverage and proﬁtability should be
positive. On the other hand, if the market for corporate control is ineffective, managers of
proﬁtable ﬁrms may choose to avoid the discipliningr o l eo fd e b tb yl e v e r a g i n gd o w n ,t h e n
the relationship between leverage and proﬁtability should be negative.
As for earning volatility, the “static trade-off" hypothesis, “pecking-order" hypothesis,
agency costs related consideration and product market interaction theory all predict the neg-
ative relationship between leverage and earnings volatility.
F. Flexibility Financial ﬂexibility is usually referred to as the amount of cash that ﬁrms
8b u i l du po v e rt i m e . I tc a nb ev i e w e da sn e g a t i v ed e b t . I ft h e r ei sn oe f f e c t i v em a r k e tf o r
corporate control, management would prefer to retain excess amount of cash (Opler, et al.
1999). “Pecking-order" hypothesis also suggests that there should be a negative relationship
between leverage and ﬂexibility.
G. Other risk factors that affect ﬁrms’ cost of debt Commodity price risk, debt term
structure risk (change in the long-term versus short term interest rate) are also factors that
affect ﬁrms’ cost of debt. However, such factors are in general not ﬁrm speciﬁc and not
included in our analysis due to the lack of data.
H. Corporate governance issues The concentration of ownership is very high in the
Netherlands, on average 41.4% of a ﬁrm’s equity is owned by top three largest shareholders
(De Jong and Van Dijk, 1999). Takeover defenses are broadly used by Dutch ﬁrms5.U s u -
ally Dutch ﬁrms adopt multiple anti-takeover barriers. In addition, as for the composition
of supervisory board, Dutch ﬁrms adopt a process which is often referred to as the “co-
option system” where the new members of the supervisory board are elected by the current
members.
3 The Data and Construction of Proxies
T h es o u rc eo fa l lth ed a t aist h e“ J a a r b o e kv a nNederlandse Ondernemingen", which contains
the ﬁnancial statement for all public Dutch ﬁrms. From the total sample, we deleted all the
ﬁnancial ﬁrms (banks, insurance companies and investment companies) and ﬁrms that did
not have a complete record on the variables required in our analysis. In total, 118 ﬁrms are
available.
5According to De Jong and Veld (2001), (1) 39.3% of the Dutch ﬁrms have priority shares that allow a
small number of shares to carry superior voting rights; (2) 63.0% of the Dutch ﬁrms have preferred shares
arrangement which allows an issue of preferred shares with only 25% of the nominal value to be paid up
without further shareholders’ approval; (3) In case of a takeover threat, the ﬁrm can place the priority shares
and the preferred shares with a befriended party in exchange for a loan; (4) For 38.3% of the Dutch ﬁrms,
shareholders own receipts which carry the cash ﬂow rights without the voting rights; (5) 8.3% of the Dutch
ﬁrms’ share only have limited voting power, irrespective of the number of shares an entity possesses.
93.1 Measures of Financing Behavior
Since ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing behavior is ultimately reﬂected in the change of capital structure, we
use the change of a ﬁrm’s leverage to measure a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing choice. More speciﬁcally,
we use the following four measures for the change of leverage: namely the change of on-
going book value long-term and short term debt over the total book value capital assets
(denotedby dLT-LEVBand dST-LEVB), andthechangeofmarketvaluelong-termandshort
termdebtoverthetotalmarketvaluecapital assets(denotedbydLT-LEVManddST-LEVM).
Due to data limitation, the book-value of debt is used as an approximation of market-value of
debt. Such an approach is widely adopted in the capital structure literature simply because
the cross-sectional correlation between the book value debt and market value debt is very
large, thus the mis-speciﬁcation due to using book value debt is likely very small. The book
value of total capital assets is calculated as follows. From the consolidated balance sheet, we
move the current liability (excluding short term debt) from the right-hand side of the balance
sheet to the left-hand side of the balance sheet, this item can be subtracted from the current
assets, the net amount is the net working capital (excluding short term debt). As a result, the
items remaining on the right-hand side of the balance sheet are short term debt, long term
debt, equity, provision for bad debt and pension liability, and minority interest. The sum of
the ﬁrst four items gives us the book-value of total capital assets. To be comparable among
ﬁrms, minority interest is not included in the total capital assets6. To calculate the market
value leverages, the sum of book value short-term and long-term debt, provision and market
value equity is used as approximation of the market value of total capital assets.
3.2 Proxies of Various Factors
As mentioned before, in our model we can also test whether a ﬁrm’s debt ratio is related
to its subsequent capital structure change, i.e. whether ﬁrms adjust their capital structures
toward an optimal or target debt-equity ratio. We include current leverage level as a factor
of management ﬁnancing decision. The measures of current leverage are respectively the
book value long-term and short-term debt over the total book value capital assets (denoted
by LT-LEVB and ST-LEVB) and the market value long-term and short-term debt over the
6If the minority interest is included, then ﬁrms with minority interest will appear to be less levered. How-
ever, there is no way for us to know the capital structure of the minority ﬁrm. If the minority ﬁrm is highly
levered, then the leverage ratio we obtain by including minority interest can be quite distorted.
10total market value capital assets (denoted by LT-LEVM and ST-LEVM).
The consensus of the attributes that affect capital structure choice is “leverage increases
with ﬁxed assets, non-debt tax shields, investment opportunities, and ﬁrm size, decreases
with earning volatility, advertising expenditure, the probability of bankruptcy, proﬁtability
and uniqueness of the product” (Harris and Raviv, 1991). In addition, we also include the
factors pertaining to the speciﬁc institutional setting in the Netherlands. Due to the unavail-
ability of data, advertising expenditure and uniqueness of the product are not included in our
analysis.
Provision ratio (RROV) We use the ratio between the provision of bad debt and pension
liability and total capital assets which consist of long-term, short-term debt, equity and pro-
vision (PROV/TA) as the measure of provision. We argue that this is the most signiﬁcant and
meaningful variable as a proxy of non-debt tax shield in the Dutch case7. Cools (1993) uses
depreciation ratio8 (depreciation over book value of total assets) and intangible assets ratio
(intangible assets over book value of total assets) as proxy of non-debt tax shield. However,
our understanding is that depreciation ratio is set according to certain accounting rules to
reﬂect the remaining value of the underlyinga s s e t s .B a s e do no u rs a m p l e ,w ed on o tﬁnd the
relationship between depreciation ratio and leverages anywhere near signiﬁcant. The prob-
lem with respect to using intangible assets ratio to proxy for non-debt tax shield is that not all
intangible assets are recorded on the balance sheet for Dutch companies. As a matter of fact,
only a very small portion of the total intangible assets, mainly patents, are recorded as intan-
gible assets on the balance sheet. Goodwills due to acquisitions are completely written-off
when they occur.
C. Size (SIZE) We use three variables as proxies of size: logarithmic transformation of
sales (lnSALES), logarithmic transformation of total number of workers (lnWORKER) and
logarithmic transformation of equity market value (lnMV).
D. Growth Opportunity (GROWTH) We use three variables as proxies of growth: per-
centage change in total assets market value (dTA), percentage change in sales (dSALES) and
7Some authors use R&D as proxy of non-debt tax shield (Bradley et al, 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988),
however, only a very limited ﬁrms report this amount in the Netherlands. Others use investment tax credits as
proxy of non-debt tax shield (Bradley et al., 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988; and MacKie-Mason, 1990), but
such an item is not applicable to the Dutch case (Cools, 1993).
8In the U.S. studies, DeAngelo and Maslis (1980), Auerbach (1985), Kim and Sörensen, 1986, and Titman
and Wessels (1988).
11logarithmic transformation of equity market to book ratio (lnMBR).
E. Proﬁtability ( P R O F )W eu s et w ov a r i a b l e sa sp r o x i e so fp r o ﬁtability: the ratio of EBIT
over sales (EBIT/SAL) and return on equity (ROE).
F. Earnings volatility (VOLA) We use two variables as proxies of earnings volatility: the
logarithmic transformation of standard deviation of net income (lnSdNI) and the logarithmic
transformation of standard deviation of EBIT (lnSdEBIT).
G.Flexibility(FLEX)Financialﬂexibilityisusuallyreferredtoastheamount ofcashthat
ﬁrms build up over time. It can be viewed as negative debt. If there is no effective market for
corporate control, management would prefer to retain excess amount of cash (Opler, et al.
1999). “Pecking-order" hypothesis also suggests that there should be a negative relationship
between leverage and ﬂexibility. We deﬁne the ﬁnancial ﬂexibility as the ratio of cash and
marketable securities over current assets (C$/CA).
The variables discussed in the previous sections are analyzed over the period of 1992
through 1997. For our analysis, we denote the whole sample period from 1992 to 1997
by year 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. As illustrated in Figure 1, we calculate the average leverage
over years 4 and 5 (period II), compared to the average leverage over years 2 and 3 (period
I). Averaging over two years reduces the measurement error due to year over year random
ﬂuctuations. The realized information period for period I is years 1 and 2, and the expected
information period for period I is years 3 and 4. The realized information period for period
II is years 3 and 4, and the expected information period for period II is years 5 and 6. In
addition to reducing measurement error, another justiﬁcation for averaging over two-year
period and investigating changes over two-year period instead of year-over-year change is
that suppose managers do observe the factors or certain accounting indicators, it can only
happen close to the end of a ﬁscal quarter or year. Consequently there is a time-lag for
managers to react to the changes in certain factors and for a ﬁrm’s leverage to be adjusted to
the desirable level.
The similarity between this model and other cross-section studies mentioned in the intro-
duction is that we all aim to test the behavior of ﬁrms over a given time span. The difference
between this model and the previous studies is that while most authors test the relationship
between the absolute level of leverage and the level of various factors, we look at the change
of leverage with respect to change of certain factors. Therefore, we emphasize the period
over period dynamic behavior of ﬁrms’ capital structure changes. The dependent variables,
12Figure 1: The Illustration of Time Period Used in the Analysis
i.e. the debt ratios, are measured during period I (1993-1994) and period II (1995-96). Three
indicators of expected future growth (dTA, dSALES, lnMBR) are calculated over the ex-
pected information period, namely 1994 and 1995 for period I and 1996 and 1997 for period
II. The idea is to use the realized values as proxies of the expected future growth when the
capital structure decision is made. The var i a b l e su s e da si n d i c a t o r so fs i z ea n dp r o ﬁtability
are calculated over the realized information period, namely 1992 and 1993 for period I and
1994 and 1995 for period II. The idea of using earlier periodt oc a l c u l a t ep r o ﬁtability and
size proxies is to treat them as realized information. The standard deviations of net income
and EBIT are calculated over the whole sample period in order to obtain better estimates.
Other variables are calculated contemporaneously with dependent variables, that is over pe-
riod I (1993-1994) and period II (1995-1996). The summary statistics of the data is reported
in Table 1, from which we can see that there are signiﬁcant variations across ﬁrms in both
the dependent and independent variables.
13Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Data
Factors Indicators Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std Dev
dLEVBL -0.007 -0.005 -0.162 0.328 0.062
dLEV dLEVBS 0.016 0.000 -0.117 0.323 0.069
dLEVML -0.021 -0.007 -0.224 0.153 0.061
dLEVMS 0.004 0.000 -.0142 0.165 0.054
dPROV dPROV/TA -0.003 -0.001 -0.095 0.128 0.034
dTANG dFA/TA -0.017 -0.014 -0.190 0.152 0.047
dlnSALES 0.118 0.126 -0.701 0.703 0.196
dSIZE dlnWORKER 0.015 0.014 -0.604 0.560 0.193
dlnMV 0.317 0.308 -0.562 2.148 0.439
ddTA 0.046 0.098 -4.428 0.817 0.492
dGROWTH ddsales 0.035 0.042 -0.499 0.781 0.171
dlnMBR 0.299 0.296 -0.922 3.448 0.534
dPROF dEBIT/SAL 0.007 0.007 -0.095 0.133 0.031
dROE 0.032 0.187 -1.894 1.436 0.246
dVOLA dlnSdNI -0.150 -0.304 -4.466 4.826 1.503
dlnSdEBIT -0.145 -0.161 -3.290 4.508 1.225
dFLEX dC$/CA 0.005 -0.001 -0.296 0.283 0.079
LEVBL 0.189 0.187 0.000 0.647 0.156
LEV LEVBS 0.094 0.052 0.000 0.724 0.123
LEVML 0.151 0.126 0.000 0.663 0.145
LEVMS 0.077 0.034 0.000 0.609 0.107
Note: Data Source is the “Jaarboek van Nederlandse Ondernemingen". Number of ﬁrms: 118
144 The Structural Equation Model: Determinants of Firms’
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As we can see from section 3, a unique and important aspect of the capital structure theory
is that many theoretical attributes or factors identiﬁed as the determinants of a ﬁrm’s capital
structure choice are often non-directly observed latent variables. That is, there is often no
single accounting indicator that can be used as the exact representation of each factor. Con-
sequently, traditional regression model has often relied on various proxies of the unobserved
theoretical attributes for empirical analysis. The main drawbacks of the regression model
approach, as also summarized in Titman and Wessels (1988) , are as follows. First, in the
case that there are more than one possible proxy for a particular attribute, choosing a single
indicator as proxy can be arbitrary, and consequently may bias the parameter estimates and
change the signiﬁcance levels of the statistical tests. Second, it is often difﬁcult to ﬁnd prox-
ies of particular attributes that are unrelated to other attributes. That is, certain indicators
can be used as proxies of different attributes or factors. Third, since the observed variables
are proxies of the attributes (with measurement errors), their use in regression analysis in-
troduces an errors-in-variable (EIV) problem which can lead to biased parameter estimates.
Finally, measurement errors in the proxy variables may be correlated with measurement er-
rors in the dependent variables, creating spurious effects.
In this paper, we use the linear structural equation modelling technique to analyze Dutch
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing behavior 9.V e r y b r i e ﬂy, this method assumes that, although the relevant
theoretical attributes are not directly observable, we can observe a number of indicators that
are linear functions of one or more attributes with a random error term. The model consists
of two parts: a structural model that describes the relationship between a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing
behavior and changes in various theoretical attributes, and a measurement model that iden-
tiﬁes the relationship between the attributes and various indicator or proxy variables, in this
particular case, a ﬁrm’s accounting data. The capital structure theory does not specify any
functional form for how exactly the factors or attributes are related to a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing be-
havior and a ﬁrm’s accounting indicators. In our model, we impose the linear structure on
9References to linear structural modeling technique can also be found in the literature under the headings of
analysis-of-covariance structures, path analysis, causal models, and content-variables models. A non-technical
introduction to the subject providing many references is Bentler and Bonett (1980).
15all relations. That is, we only intend to investigate the ﬁrst-order relationship among all vari-
ables, which is determined by the sign and signiﬁcance of the estimated coefﬁcients. The
main advantage of the structural equation modeling is that it provides a unique analysis that
simultaneously considers questions of both measurement and structural relations. Unlike
exploratory factor analysis which is guided by intuitive and ad hoc rules, the measurement
model casts a factor analysis in the tradition of hypothesis testing with explicit tests of both
the overall quality of measurement and the speciﬁc factor loadings composing the model.
Moreover, unlike the multiple regression analyses that are exploring the statistical relation-
ship among only observed variables, the structural model allows for the speciﬁcation and
testing of complex “path”or structural relations.
The model we estimate is an application of the LISREL system developed by K. Jöreskog
and D. Sörbom (1981). In particular, in our model set-up, only the exogenous variables, i.e.
the theoretical attributes of ﬁnancing decisions, are unobserved or latent variables, while the
endogenous variables , i.e. the measures of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing behavior, are directly observed
and free of measurement error. These measures are constructed using the change in a ﬁrm’s
debt-equity ratio. The measurement model is speciﬁed as follows:
x = Λξ + δ, (1)
where x is a q×1 vector of observable indicators, i.e. a ﬁrm’s accounting data, ξ is an m×1
vector of unobserved exogenous variables, i.e. the changes in ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes, Λ is a
q × m matrix of factor loadings of x on ξ,a n dδ is a q × 1 vector of measurement error. In
our model, we have 15 indicator variables for 9 attributes–thus, x i sam a t r i xo fd i m e n s i o n
15 × 1 and Λ is a matrix of dimension 15 × 9.
The structural model is speciﬁed as the following system of equations:
y = Γξ + ε, (2)
Where y is a p × 1 vector of endogenous variable, i.e. the measures of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing
behavior or the change of a ﬁrm’s debt-equity ratio, Γ is a p × m matrix of structural coefﬁ-
cients, and ε is a p × 1 vector of disturbance terms. The model is estimated for two separate
2 × 1 vectors of debt: short-term and long term debt scaled respectively by book value and
market value of total capital assets.
Equation (1) simply states that, although the ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes that are believed to
be the determinants of ﬁnancing decisions cannot be observed, a number of other variables
16denoted as indicators or proxies are observable. These indicator variables can be expressed
as linear function of one or more of the unobservable attributes and a random measurement
error. The principal advantage of this estimation procedure over standard regression models
is that it explicitly speciﬁes the relation between the unobservable attributes and the ob-
servable variables. Equation (2) can be understood as a regression model except that the
explanatory variables may be unobserved latent factors.
In order to identify the estimated equations, certain restrictions must be imposed. In most
factor-analysis models, the common factors are constrained to be orthogonal and scaled to
have unit variances, and the residuals are assumed to be uncorrelated. However, since the
common factors in this study are given deﬁnite interpretations by identifying them with
speciﬁc attributes, the assumption that the common factors are uncorrelated is untenable as
many ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes are likely to be correlated (e.g. proﬁtability and growth). For
this reason, the correlations among the unobserved attributes (the matrix Ψ)a r ee s t i m a t e d
within the model. Of course, in order to achieve identiﬁcation, additional restrictions on the
parameters of the model must be imposed.
In total, we have imposed 130 restrictions on the matrix Λ of factor loadings. These
a r es h o w ni nT a b l e2a st h ef a c t o r loadings are exogenously speciﬁed to equal either one or
zero. For example, since lnSALES is not assumed to be an indicator of TANG, its factor
loading on the TANG attribute is set to be zero and is not estimated within the model. In
addition, we have also constrained the measurement error in the equation of indicator vari-
ables PROV/TA, FA/TA and C$/CA to be zero, implying that the factor loadings of these
variables on their respective attributes are constrained to equal one. Also, we have assumed
that the measurement errors, δ, are uncorrelated with each other, with the attributes, and with
the disturbance terms in the structural equations10.
In contrast to the measurement model, the structural model is totally unrestricted. The
model estimates the impact of each of the attributes on different ﬁnancial leverages. In
other words, none of the factor loadings in the structural equations is ﬁxed exogenously. In
addition, the correlations between the residual errors in the structural equations are estimated
within the model. This allows for the possibility that there exist additional attributes, not
10Since the restrictions may not all be appropriate, interpretations of the estimates should be made with
caution. It is quite likely, for example, that some of the measurement errors may in fact be correlated. It is un-
fortunate that there is an arbitrary element in the choice of identifying restrictions; however, similar restrictions
must be made implicitly in order to interpret a standard regression model that uses proxy variables.
17Table 2: The Structure of the Measurement Model– LAMBDA-X
dPROV dTANG dSIZE dGROWTH dPROF dVOLA dFLEX LT- ST- δ
LEVB/M LEVB/M
dPROV/TA 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
dFA/TA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
dlnSALES 0 0 λ3,3 00 0 0 00 δ3
dlnWORKER 0 0 λ4,3 00 0 0 00 δ4
dlnMV 0 0 λ5,3 00 0 0 00 δ5
dTA 0 0 0 λ6,4 000 0 0 δ6
dSALES 0 0 0 λ7,4 000 0 0 δ7
dlnMBR 0 0 0 λ8,4 000 0 0 δ8
dEBIT/SA 0 0 0 0 λ9,5 00 0 0 δ9
dROE 0 0 0 0 λ10,5 00 0 0 δ10
dlnSdNI 0 0 0 0 0 λ11,6 00 0 δ11
dlnSdEBIT 0 0 0 0 0 λ12,6 00 0 δ12
dC$/CA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
LT-LEVB/M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
ST-LEVB/M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
considered in the model, that are determinants of each of the ﬁnancial leverages.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Maximum Likelihood (ML) Estimation
Theparametersofourmodelareestimatedusingthemaximumlikelihood(ML)method. The
b a s i ci d e ai st oﬁt the covariance matrix of observable variables implied by the speciﬁcation
of the model (Σ) to the covariance matrix (S) of these variables observed from the sampling
observations. In the LISREL system, this is done by minimizing the function,
F =l n ( d e tΣ) − ln(detS)+tr(SΣ
−1) − (p + q), (3)
with respect to the vector of parameters in the matrices discussed in the previous section.
This objective function is derived from maximum-likelihood procedures and assumes that
the observed variables are conditionally multinormally distributed.
The asymptotic properties of the ML estimates and the hypothesis test statistics are de-
rived based on large sample size and multivariate normality assumption. To conform with
18linear structure of the model and the normality assumption, we rescale certain variables by
taking logarithms, e.g. as in other studies, we use logarithmic total sales (lnSALES), loga-
rithmic total workers (lnWORKER), and logarithmic equity market value (lnMV), as proxies
of ﬁrm size. Different from previous studies, however, we also rescale the standard deviation
of net income (SdNI) and the standard deviation of EBIT (SdEBIT) by taking logarithms,
both of which are the proxies of a ﬁrm’s earning volatility. Using logarithmic standard devia-
tionasproxyofvolatility, wesolvetwoproblems. First, thechoiceofwhethertousestandard
deviation (σ) or variance (σ2) as measure of volatility is in general arbitrary. Through loga-
rithmic transformation, they are equivalently (lnσ versus 2lnσ) in a linear framework. Sec-
ond, standard deviations can only take non-negative values and are obviously not normally
distributed, thus violating the normality assumption. However, both the plots and summary
statistics suggest that it is quite reasonable to assume logarithmic standard deviations of both
net income and EBIT following normal distribution. Moreover, our analysis also shows that
the parameter estimates based on using SdNI and SdEBIT as proxies of volatility are much
less robust than using ln(SdNI) and ln(SdEBIT) as proxies for volatility. This is due to the
fact that, without rescaling the standard deviation, very high earnings volatilities for certain
ﬁrms appear to be outliers. In addition, the quality of measurement is also signiﬁcantly im-
proved based on lnSdNI and lnSdEBIT. Similar ﬁndings are observed for the market book
r a t i o( M B R )a f t e rr e s c a l i n gb yt a k i n gl o g a r i t h m s( l n M B R ) .
5.2 Estimates of the Parameters and the Path Diagrams
The estimates of the parameters of the measurement model for the book value based SEM
are reported in Tables 3. Almost all factor loadings are highly signiﬁcant. The estimates are
generallyin accord with our aprioriideasabout howwelltheindicatorvariables measure the
unobserved attributes. Both the direction and the magnitude, as well as the statistical signiﬁ-
cance, of the estimates suggest that these indicators capture the theoretical attributes we wish
to consider as determinants of ﬁnancing decisions. Very similar results of the measurement
model are obtained for the market value based SEM, thus they are not reported.
The path diagrams are plotted in Figure 2 and Figure 3. The estimates of the structural
coefﬁcients for both the book value and market value based SEMs are reported in Table 5.
These coefﬁcients measure the estimated impact of changes in various attributes or factors
on the ﬁnancial behavior.
19Table 3: Measurement Model: Factor Loadings for Independent Variables-LAMBDA-X
dPROV dTANG dSIZE dGROWTH dPROF dVOLA dFLEX LT-LEVB ST-LEVB
d P R O V / T A 1 . 0 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
d F A / T A -- 1 . 0 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
dlnSALES - - – 0.42 - - - - - - - - - - - -
(0.18)
2.38
dlnWORKER - - - - 1.92 - - - - - - - - - - - -
(0.73)
2.65
dlnMV - - - - 0.03 - - - - - - - - - - - -
(0.03)
0.93
ddTA - - - - - - 0.74 - - - - - - - - - -
(0.12)
6.31
d d S A L E S -- -- -- 0 . 3 8 -- -- -- -- --
(0.10)
3.87
d l n M B R -- -- -- 0 . 3 9 -- -- -- -- --
(0.10)
3.99
dEBIT/SAL - - - - - - - - 0.86 - - - - - - - -
(0.09)
9.80
d R O E -- -- -- -- 0 . 5 6 -- -- -- --
(0.08)
6.68
dlnSdNI - - - - - - - - - - 0.58 - - - - - -
(0.09)
6.52
d l n S d E B I -- -- -- -- -- 0 . 8 4 -- -- --
(0.10)
8.49
d C $ / C A -- -- -- -- -- -- 1 . 0 0 -- --
L T - L E V B -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1 . 0 0 --
ST-LEVB - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.00
20Table 4: Estimated Correlations between Attributes







dSIZE 0.01 0.00 1.00
(0.03) (0.03)
0.35 -0.05
dGROWTH -0.03 -0.10 0.08 1.00
(0.10) (0.10) (0.06)
-0.32 -1.00 1.46
dPROF 0.03 0.01 -0.17 0.00 1.00
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12)
0.38 0.11 -1.79 0.01
dVOLA -0.11 0.28 0.04 0.08 -0.52 1.00
(0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.12) (0.09)
-1.15 3.09 1.03 0.72 -5.46
dFLEX -0.11 0.08 -0.07 0.00 0.33 -0.14 1.00
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
-1.35 1.05 -1.48 -0.03 3.70 -1.53 8.86
LT-LEVB 0.18 -0.19 -0.04 0.13 0.03 -0.14 0.06 1.00
(0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11)
2.23 -2.35 -1.10 1.28 0.30 -1.56 0.79 8.86
ST-LEVB 0.06 0.10 -0.07 -0.40 -0.07 -0.04 -0.11 0.08 1.00
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11)
0.76 1.20 -1.45 -3.97 -0.79 -0.42 -1.31 0.98 8.86
21Figure 2: Path Diagram of Book-Value-Based Structural Equation Model
22Figure 3: Path Diagram of the Market-Value-Based Structural Euqation Model
23For the most part, the coefﬁcient estimates for the long-term and short-term leverages
are of the predicted sign from our earlier discussion. We focus our analysis on the book
value based model and the estimation results are summarized as follows. Firstly, among the
most signiﬁcant factors of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions are changes in proﬁtability (dPROF),
changes in ﬁnancial ﬂexibility (dFLEX), current debt ratios for both long-term debt and
short-term debt (LT-LEVB and ST-LEVB), changes in volatility (dVOLA), changes in tan-
gibility (dTANG), as well as changes in growth (dGROWTH). Secondly, current debt ratios
are negatively correlated with the subsequent changes in a ﬁrm’s leverage, changes in both
proﬁtability and growth are negatively correlated with changes of both long-term debt ratio
and short-term debt ratio, though the relation between the change of long-term debt ratio
and the change in proﬁtability and the relation between the change of short-term debt ratio
and the change in growth are insigniﬁcant. Changes in both earning’s volatility and ﬁnan-
cial ﬂexibility have signiﬁcant negative relation with only short-term debt ratio. Thirdly,
although changes in provision (dPROV) is negatively correlated with both long-term and
short-term debt ratios, neither is statistically signiﬁcant. Similarly, while changes in size
are positively related to changes of both long-term debt ratio and short-term debt ratio, the
coefﬁcients are highly insigniﬁcant. Changes in tangibility are negatively related to changes
of both long-term debt ratio and short-term debt ratio, but only marginally signiﬁcant with
long-term debt ratio. Fourthly, while changes in short-term debt ratio are highly related to
(at 1% critical level) current debt ratio and changes in ﬁnancial ﬂexibility and proﬁtability,
changes of long-term debt ratio are only highly related to (at 1% critical level) current debt
ratio. Fifthly, the estimation results in the market value based model are consistent with both
statistical relations between various variables and the results in the book value based mod-
els. Since the higher a ﬁrm’s growth rate and proﬁtability are, the higher a ﬁrm’s stock price
tends to be, it is not surprising to see the negative relation between changes in both growth
and proﬁtability and change of market value debt ratio. It is noted that the negative relation
is consistent with the book value based model. Furthermore, the negative relation between
change of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility and change of short-term debt ratio, as well as negative re-
lations between current debt ratio and subsequent leverage changes for both long-term and
short-term debt are also consistent with the book value based model. Finally, based on the
goodness-of-ﬁt tests, the estimated models are not sufﬁcient to explain the cross-sectional
v a r i a t i o ni naﬁrm’s leverage.
24Table 5: Estimates of Structural Coefﬁcients-GAMMA
dPROV dTANG dSIZE dGROWTH dPROF dVOLA dFLEX LT-LEVB ST-LEVB
dLEVBL -0.11 -0.16 0.05 -0.17 -0.07 0.08 0.02 -0.25 --
(0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08)
-1.49 -1.87 1.24 -1.70 -0.58 0.69 0.27 -3.19
dLEVBS -0.09 0.00 0.01 -0.06 -0.39 -0.24 -0.24 -- -0.36
(0.07) (0.08) (0.03) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08)
-1.28 -0.06 0.31 -0.58 -3.11 -1.94 -3.13 -4.40
dPROV dTANG dSIZE dGROWTH dPROF dVOLA dFLEX LT-LEVM ST-LEVM
dLEVML 0.02 -0.12 0.03 -0.28 -0.19 -0.02 0.05 -0.39 --
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08)
0.29 -1.53 0.58 -2.79 -1.98 -0.22 0.68 -5.13
dLEVMS -0.10 -0.06 0.01 -0.29 -0.18 -0.07 -0.25 -- -0.46
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
-1.36 -0.76 0.12 -2.73 -1.81 -0.65 -3.23 -5.65
5.3 Robustness of Estimation Results
As we have mentioned earlier, inappropriate scaling of observed variables may cause the
estimation results to be non-robust. In this paper, we have carefully re-scaled the observed
variables, in particular the proxies of GROWTH and VOLA via logarithmic transformation,
in order to conform with the linear structure of the model and multivariate normality as-
sumption. Our analysis shows that this has led to signiﬁcant improvement in the robustness
of parameters estimates. A further examination of the robustness is also performed by inves-
tigating whether certain outliers cause signiﬁcant change to our empirical results. We repeat
the estimation by leaving out the ﬁrms with highest or lowest values for a particular factor,
the estimation results have no signiﬁcant changes. An examination of the correlation matrix
of the sample data (Table 6) provides further insights about the robustness of our results. We
note that there is no high correlation between two proxies of different factors. This ﬁnd-
ing is consistent with the estimated correlation matrix between factors as in Table 4, which
suggests no spurious correlation among the indicators or attributes.
5.4 Further Discussions
Our estimation results conclude that even if the factors considered in our models are indeed
the determinants of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial decision, not surprisingly, ﬁrms are not adjusting their
25Table 6: The Correlation Matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
dLEVBL(1) 1.000
dLEVBS(2) -0.081 1.000
dLEVML(3) 0.655 0.021 1.000
dLEVMS(4) -0.064 0.879 0.216 1.000
dPROV/TA(5) -0.167 -0.072 -0.049 -0.084 1.000
dFA/TA(6) -0.067 -0.127 0.036 -0.057 -0.006 1.000
dlnSALES(7) 0.092 0.111 0.083 -0.007 -0.010 -0.164 1.000
dlnWORKER(8) 0.146 0.236 0.141 0.123 0.011 -0.125 0.818 1.000
dlnMV(9) -0.008 0.009 0.002 -0.064 0.061 -0.107 0.312 0.217 1.000
ddTA(10) -0.160 0.009 -0.082 0.023 -0.037 -0.025 -0.184 -0.070 -0.387 1.000
ddSALES(11) -0.023 0.099 -0.035 0.129 0.025 -0.006 -0.318 -0.100 -0.072 0.312
dlnMBR(12) 0.088 0.068 -0.250 -0.108 -0.003 -0.250 0.010 0.062 -0.121 0.310
dEBIT/SAL(13) -0.147 -0.230 -0.201 -0.179 0.042 -0.017 -0.036 -0.258 0.136 -0.010
dROE(14) 0.031 -0.414 -0.010 -0.270 -0.035 0.118 -0.115 -0.263 0.064 0.020
dlnSdNI(15) 0.072 -0.042 0.065 -0.016 -0.094 0.266 -0.001 0.047 -0.273 0.007
dlnSdEBIT(16) 0.078 0.028 0.163 0.140 -0.078 0.206 -0.128 -0.052 -0.223 0.100
dC$/CA(17) -0.031 -0.293 -0.028 -0.219 -0.108 0.084 -0.091 -0.182 -0.102 -0.004
LT-LEVB(18) -0.280 -0.077 -0.350 -0.105 0.181 -0.190 -0.063 -0.110 -0.008 0.096
ST-LEVB(19) 0.102 -0.280 0.122 -0.286 0.061 0.096 -0.059 -0.139 0.099 -0.256
LT-LEVM(20) -0.217 -0.116 -0.443 -0.170 0.162 -0.180 -0.171 -0.224 -0.099 0.063
ST-LEVM(21) 0.103 -0.309 0.058 -0.340 0.038 0.110 -0.151 -0.229 -0.004 -0.150
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
ddSALES(11) 1.000
dlnMBR(12) 0.006 1.000
dEBIT/SAL(13) -0.053 0.063 1.000
dROE(14) 0.007 0.041 0.479 1.000
dlnSdNI(15) -0.007 -0.066 -0.236 -0.042 1.000
dlnSdEBIT(16) 0.168 -0.216 -0.410 -0.167 0.491 1.000
dC$/CA(17) 0.059 -0.050 0.271 0.248 -0.102 -0.112 1.000
LT-LEVB(18) -0.016 0.109 0.009 0.050 -0.045 -0.136 0.063 1.000
ST-LEVB(19) -0.155 -0.276 -0.107 0.163 0.022 -0.049 -0.105 0.078 1.000
LT-LEVM(20) -0.007 0.199 0.038 0.097 -0.063 -0.176 0.066 0.895 0.092 1.000
ST-LEVM(21) -0.160 -0.183 -0.103 0.153 0.031 -0.067 -0.103 0.098 0.957 0.180 1.000
26ﬁnancing behavior based on market value measures. Thus, we focus our analysis on the
book value based model. Overall, our estimation results provide moderate support for both
the traditional trade-off theory, the pecking order theory, and the dynamic capital structure
theory.
The fact that a ﬁrm’s debt ratio is negatively related to subsequent change in leverage
implies that ﬁrms with relatively high debt ratios tend to re-adjust their leverage downwards,
while ﬁrms with relatively low debt ratios tend to re-adjust their leverage upward. This
ﬁnding provides moderate support of the static trade-off model. However, due to the lack of
long-run data, our results can not conﬁrm the static trade-off model, according to which a
ﬁrm is believed to adjust their debt level toward an optimal level. The test of such hypothesis
requires not only cross-section but also time-series data of ﬁrms. Rather, our empirical
ﬁndings are more or less consistent with the dynamic models of capital structure, which
suggest that ﬁrms may periodically re-adjust capital structures toward a target ratio.
The signiﬁcant negative relationship between proﬁtability change and change of short
term debt ratio, the signiﬁcant negative relationship between growth change and change of
long-term debt ratio, as well as the signiﬁcant negative relation between the change of ﬁnan-
cial ﬂexibility and the change of short-term debt ratio are all consistent with the “pecking-
order" hypothesis. The pecking-order model suggest that ﬁrms prefer using retained earn-
ings rather than debt to fund new investment. Thus it is not surprising to see that as proﬁt
increases, debt ratio tends to decrease. In particular, our estimation result suggests that ﬁrms
tend to more consistently replace short-term debt with retained earnings. This is implied
from the highly signiﬁcant negative relation between change of proﬁtability and change of
short-term debt ratio, but an insigniﬁcant negative relation between change of proﬁtability
and change of long-term debt-ratio. Myers (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that
since a ﬁrm consists of both assets in place and growth opportunities, debt ratio is likely
determined by the relative weights of these two components. In particular, ﬁrms should use
relatively more debt to ﬁnance assets in place and relatively more equity to ﬁnance growth
opportunities. As Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2000) point out that the distinction be-
tween the debt capacity of assets in place and growth opportunities is also important in
agency settings such as Stulz (1990), Hart and Moore (1996) and Zwiebel (1996). Our
empirical results conﬁrm above theories and suggest that as a ﬁrm’s growth opportunities
increase, it tends to rely more on equity ﬁnancing than on debt ﬁnancing. It is also not sur-
27prising to see that the negative relation between change of growth opportunity and change
of debt ratio is more signiﬁcant for long-term debt, as growth essentially requires long-term
debt ﬁnancing.
While empirical evidence provides support for the pecking-order behavior of ﬁrms’ ﬁ-
nancing decision, we argue that it would be difﬁcult, especially in the Dutch case, to justify
that the pecking-order behavior is caused by asymmetric information as conjectured by the
pecking-order hypothesis. The pecking-order model by Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests
that due to informational asymmetry between management and investors, external funds are
undervaluedinrelationtothedegreeofasymmetry. Thus, externalfunds, intheorderofdebt,
convertible securities, and equity, are less desirable to ﬁrms. However, as Opler et al. (1999)
and Graham and Harvey (2000) argue that the pecking-order behavior may not be caused by
asymmetric information. Based on survey responses from CFOs of American ﬁrms, Graham
and Harvey (2000) note that the importance of ﬁnancial ﬂexibility in particular is not related
to informational asymmetry (measured by size or dividend payout) or growth opportunities
in the manner suggested by the pecking-order theory. In general, theirﬁndings fail to provide
support for the theory that informational asymmetry causes pecking-order behavior. As for
Dutch ﬁrms, it would be even more difﬁcult to justify that the asymmetric information argu-
ment behind the “pecking-order” behavior is valid. The ﬁrms’ dependence on bank ﬁnancing
mentioned before implies little asymmetric information, if there is any, between debt holders
and shareholders.
The change in provision is negatively related to the change of short term debt ratio. Our
explanation is that when provision ratio goes up, it is very likely that the ﬁrm’s increase
of bad debt raises the cost of short-term debt, because the collateral of short-term debt is
usually short-term assets such as account receivables. On the other hand, when provision
ratio decreases, bad debt decreases and the cost of short-term debt decreases by the same
argument. Thus ﬁrms are more willing to issue short-term debt to take advantage of the tax
beneﬁts.
Considering that we are measuring the changes of ﬁrm size over two-year time span, the
relative scale of the ﬁrm is not expected to change dramatically, and understandably change
in size is not signiﬁcantly related to the change of long-term debt ratio and short-term debt
ratio.
Change of tangibility is negatively related to the change of debt ratios, and moderately
28signiﬁcant (at 10% conﬁdence level) with long-term debt ratio. While change of both earn-
ing’s volatility and ﬁnancial ﬂexibility have a signiﬁcant negative relation with the change
of short-term debt ratio, they have an insigniﬁcant but positive relation with the change of
long-term debt ratio.
Our model has also identiﬁed certain important factors such as provision ratio, ﬁnancial
ﬂexibility, which have so far been ignored in the literature of ﬁnancial decisions for Dutch
ﬁrms.
Firstly, provision ratio as non-debt tax shield is shown to be negatively correlated with a
ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial leverage. This suggest that the “static trade-off” hypothesis is strongly sup-
ported by the Dutch evidence. Secondly, ﬁnancial ﬂexibility, measured by the ratio of cash
and marketable securities over current assets is also shown to be negatively correlated with
a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial leverages. Since a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial ﬂexibility can also be viewed as inter-
nal debt, it provides further evidence to support the “pecking-order” hypothesis. However,
from the mixing results of other factors, the rationale of asymmetric information behind the
“pecking-order” hypothesis is not evident in the Dutch case. To the contrary, the asymmetric
information argument is more rejected than accepted. As predicted by the asymmetric infor-
mation theory, growth, proﬁtability and earnings volatility should all be negatively correlated
to a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial leverages. Our empirical results suggest that signs between growth and
leverages are consistently the opposite to what is predicted by theory. At the best, growth
is an insigniﬁcant factor of capital structure for Dutch ﬁrms. A possible explanation is that
since 97% of the private debt is issued by banks and other ﬁnancial institutions instead of
the capital market in the Netherlands, and on average, there is a representative of the lenders
sitting in the board of directors, there is less degree of information asymmetry between the
lenders and the borrowers, i.e. the ﬁrms.
Furthermore, the fact that ﬁnancial ﬂexibility is negatively related to a ﬁrm’s leverages
may lead to the conclusion that the corporate management of Dutch ﬁrms is in general en-
trenched. This conclusion appears to be further supported by the argument that there is a
lack of market for corporate control in the Netherlands, see De Jong a n dV e l d( 2 0 0 1 ) .H o w -
ever, this observation can also be explained by the fact that the management of Dutch ﬁrms
is extremely risk averse due to the stringent bankruptcy laws.
Finally, our empirical results show that while tangibility is positively correlated with
long-term leverage, it is negatively correlated with short-term leverage, for both book-value
29and market-value measures. Since tangibility measures the level of collateral assets, it is safe
to assume that ﬁrms with higher tangibility are more accessible to loans. Thus the above
results suggest that ﬁr m s ,w h e nt h e yc a nc h o o s e ,t e n dt op refer long-term debt to short-term
debt.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper uses the structural equation modeling (SEM) technique to empirically test the
determinants of capital structure choice for Dutch ﬁrms. We include major factors identiﬁed
byvariouscapitalstructuretheoriesandconstructproxiesforthesefactorswithconsideration
of speciﬁc institutional settings in the Netherlands. We also carefully rescale the observed
variables in order to conform with the linear structure of the model and the multivariate
normality assumption. Our empirical results shed many important insights on the Dutch
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing behavior. In particular, we identiﬁed important factors that have so far been
ignored in the literature for the Dutch capital structure choice. Furthermore, our results
provide evidence supporting the “static trade-off” hypothesis. While our results also imply
the “pecking-order” behavior of Dutch ﬁrms, they cast doubt on the rationale of asymmetric
information behind the “pecking-order” hypothesis. In other words, while available capital
structure theories can generate stylized empirical phenomena of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing behavior,
they fail to provide the rationale or explanation for such behavior. We also point out that
the static cross-section analysis is not sufﬁcient to conclude whether or not the management
of Dutch ﬁrms is entrenched. Models based on dynamic behavior of ﬁrms’ capital structure
choice are called for such tests, which we will pursue in a separate study.
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